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Introduction
It is very rare, if ever, to find a firm where all of its workers are treated just equally. In most cases, some workers, typically those higher up in the hierarchy, are conferred more authority and hence carry an asymmetrically larger weight in the decision-making process than others.
At the same time, those with more authority are also given more stringent incentives and moreover held responsible for a wider range of outcomes, such as the firm's or their respective division's overall performances. While the degree of centralization or worker empowerment differs across firms as well as over time, workers are by and large divided asymmetrically in terms of both authority and responsibility. In this paper, we view these asymmetric allocations of authority and responsibility as essential features of hierarchical organizations and examine why hierarchies often prevail in organizations from that perspective.
At a glance, the asymmetric allocation of responsibility seems to be a straightforward consequence of that of authority: if a worker is entitled to make a decision, he should be held accountable for any consequences brought by that decision. In this line of reasoning, it is the allocation of authority which subsequently determines the allocation of responsibility, so that the causation runs from authority to responsibility. What is implicit in this argument is therefore that the principal can allocate (formal) authority at her own discretion, e.g., by granting or restricting access to critical resources, as often assumed in the literature (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 2001; Dessein, 2002; Hart and Moore, 2005 ).
This may not always be the case, however, because there may not exist such critical resources that are indispensable for production or because there may be no realistic way to control access to those resources. Since the presence of hierarchy is quite ubiquitous in firm organizations, it seems worthwhile to explore the nature of hierarchy in an environment where, due to some technological or informational constraints, the principal has no direct control over the allocation of authority.
To this end, we consider an organization with a principal (the contract designer) and two agents. Each agent privately chooses a task to implement, which stochastically leads to some observable output. The productivity of each task is not known ex ante, and each agent must hence acquire information about which task is the most productive. This informationacquisition stage involves two rounds. In the first round, each agent privately exerts effort to acquire information (or produce an "idea") about the productivity of each task. This is followed by the second round where each agent sends a costless message to share this information (idea), if any, with the other agent. The problem is that the principal cannot observe each agent's task choice nor how that decision is reached (who had the idea and whose idea was adopted); the only way for the principal to control the agents is to allocate responsibility via incentive contracts contingent on the outputs. With no feasible way to allocate authority, no party can force an agent to take actions that are not in his best interest, and every decision to be made must be incentive-compatible under the agreed contracts. The chain of command (i.e., who orders and who obeys) then arises endogenously as an optimal response to the given structure of incentives.
An incentive contract in this setup is subject to two constraints: one for information acquisition (whether to exert effort to acquire information) and the other for truthful communication (whether to reveal truthfully the acquired information). The problem is that the constraint for information acquisition generally calls for competition between the agents while that for communication inherently calls for cooperation between them. These two constraints are therefore at odds with each other, and the optimal contract must achieve just the right balance between these two concerns. A hierarchy emerges when one agent (the superior) orders the other agent (the subordinate) what to do, and the subordinate has an incentive to follow the order. Under this contractual arrangement, the flow of information is restricted to be unilateral, always from the superior to the subordinate, and the superior is given a disproportionately large weight in the decision-making process ex ante. As an alternative to this arrangement, the incentive contracts may be designed to place no restriction over the flow of information. In this case, information flows from the informed party to the uninformed in an unspecified direction, and each agent is given an equal weight ex ante as in a committee. With the addition of the benchmark case, we consider and compare the following three organizational forms summarized as below. We then show that the optimal contractual arrangement is often asymmetric, where only one agent is motivated to acquire the information, and Hierarchy thus emerges as the optimal organization form. Our analysis centers around the tradeoff between costly information acquisition and costless (cheap-talk) communication. To illustrate this, we start with the benchmark case of Independent Production which makes no use of communication. The optimal contract under this arrangement generically takes the form of relative performance evaluation, where the agents are compensated based on the difference in the outputs. This is the most efficient way to provide incentives if the principal's only concern is to motivate them to exert effort. Independent Production has a clear weakness, however, because the constraint for truthful communication cannot be satisfied under relative performance evaluation. With no information flowing between the agents, therefore, it may leave some of the existing knowledge unutilized: in this sense, the level of competition between the agents is often excessive under Independent Production, which impedes cooperation that is equally critical for efficient production. Given that information is free to disseminate once it is acquired, it is clearly ex post optimal to share any useful information between the agents. Since it is not known ex ante who actually ends up with a good idea, this can be done most effectively by removing any restrictions on the flow of information.
those three cases. See Appendix B for more detail.
Given this result we now turn to Committee where both of the agents are induced to exert effort and no restriction whatsoever is placed on the extent of communication (bilateral communication) . Under this arrangement, each agent ex ante carries the same weight in the decision-making process, and information flows from a party with an idea to a party without it. A virtue of Committee is then evident: it can make the best use of the existing knowledge within the organization by fully exploit the benefit of costless communication. As it turns out, though, this ex post optimal arrangement is not ex ante optimal, as it raises the agency cost of inducing costly effort. The analysis identifies three channels through which bilateral communication entails ex ante inefficiency.
Incentive provision: To facilitate communication, the agents must be held jointly accountable, which is a less efficient way to provide incentives. Due to these problems, Committee is often less profitable, especially when the agency problem regarding information acquisition is sufficiently severe. This does not necessarily mean, though, that we must give up the benefit of communication entirely; it rather means that going all the way from no communication to bilateral communication, which places no restriction on the extent of communication, is often excessive. We argue that there is a way to exploit the benefit of communication while keeping its cost minimum. This can be done by the asymmetric allocation of responsibility where one agent, the superior, is offered high-powered (team) incentives while the other, the subordinate, is offered low-powered (individual) incentives. This asymmetric contract yields two beneficial effects. First, Hierarchy reduces the total agency cost as it only needs to motivate one agent. In an environment where information acquisition is costly while communication is free, this is a thrifty way to acquire information as a group. Second, the asymmetric and concentrated allocation of responsibility eliminates the freeriding incentive as the superior can no longer rely on the subordinate's information. We show that this asymmetric contractual arrangement is optimal for a wide range of circumstances, as it achieves the right balance of competition and cooperation. Under the asymmetric allocation of responsibility, the flow of information is restricted to be unilateral, always from the superior to the subordinate, which endogenously gives rise to the chain of command pertaining to hierarchical organizations.
The results obtained in this paper suggest that whether Hierarchy or Committee is optimal depends crucially on the severity of the agency problem. Hierarchy, which allocates responsibility asymmetrically, outperforms Committee when costly information acquisition is the main concern. We argue that this corresponds to typical firm organizations where a relatively fixed group of members must confront with and find solutions for new problems on the day-to-day basis. In such a case, Hierarchy is often optimal, lending a support for the view that most firms are hierarchical. This draws contrast to committees which typically consist of experts who are well informed in the first place. In committees, members are in many cases selected for specific problems and information acquisition is hence rarely an issue. In such a case, there is no reason to treat members asymmetrically, and Committee with the more symmetric allocation of authority and responsibility emerges as the better option to cope with the problem at hand.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. The paper is more closely related to a growing literature on committees with endogenous information. As often emphasized in the literature (Li, 2001; Li and Suen, 2009) , one of the important aspects of the model is that the ex post efficient rule is not necessarily ex ante efficient. The freeriding problem in a committee is pointed out by Li (2001) where each member must independently acquire information. 2 In that environment, he shows that a super-majority rule, the one that biases against the ex ante preferred option, can be used to mitigate the freeriding incentive. The current model provides yet another example of this situation, illuminating the tradeoff between information acquisition and communication. A point of departure is that we introduce incentive contracts into the model and suggest a different solution to this problem. 3 With the explicit consideration of incentive contracts, we also show that information acquisition in a committee entails different types of inefficiency -incentive provision and coordination.
Second, there is also a vast literature on hierarchy, too numerous to list them all. Among them, the paper is particularly related to works on the optimal allocation of authority. Aghion and Tirole (1997) is close in spirit to ours, as they shed light on the impact of the allocation of authority on the incentive to acquire information with its focus on the distinction between real and formal authority. 4 As emphasized earlier, in Aghion and Tirole and others, the starting point of the analysis is the allocation of authority which can be made by the principal at her own discretion. They then analyze how this allocation affects the agents' incentive to acquire information through the tradeoff between the loss of initiative and the loss of incentive.
Instead, we consider a situation where the principal can only allocate responsibility, which in turn determines the allocation of authority: that is, the allocation of authority is at the end point of the analysis. 5 We view our analysis as complementary to the existing literature, as it approaches the same issue from the opposite angle.
Finally, the current model builds on cheap-talk communication, put forth by Crawford and Sobel (1982) . There are now many applications of this insightful idea, and this paper belongs to this strand as well. In most applications, however, the payoff structure is exogenously given, despite the fact that the degree of preference incongruence is almost always the center of attention in cheap-talk models. Instead, we introduce incentive contracts which allow us to endogenize the degree of preference incongruence. By writing a contract, the principal can either facilitate or restrict communication. Of course, since the principal can only observe each agent's output and the incentive for information acquisition cannot hence be separated 3 The contrast between hierarchies and committees is also depicted in Sah and Stiglitz (1988) with a totally different approach. They compare three different decision-making protocols -committees, hierarchies and polyarchies -with its particular emphasis on the tradeoff between the type I and type II errors. 4 Another approach to explore the link between hierarchy and knowledge acquisition is provided by Garicano (2000) . There, the main focus is on the tradeoff between communication and knowledge acquisition costs with no regard to incentive issues. 5 It is not our intention to argue that firms do not allocate formal authority: they may or may not. Our point is rather that for the allocation of formal authority to be meaningful, it must be incentive-compatible, at least to some extent, for the subordinate to follow the superior's order. Our specification thus represents an extreme point of the spectrum while the conventional approach represents the other end.
out from that for communication, any contract inevitably affects the process of information acquisition, leading to a tradeoff which lies at the core of the analysis.
Model

The setup
Consider an organization in which a risk-neutral principal (e.g., a firm owner) hires two risk-neutral agents (e.g., employees), each denoted by ¾ ½ ¾ . Each agent independently chooses a task Ü ¾ Ä Ê to implement, which yields the output Ý ¾ ¼ ½ . Each agent's task choice is his private information, which cannot be observed by either the other agent or the principal. This means that there is no way to force an agent to take an action which is not in his best interest.
The output is either high (Ý ½) or low (Ý ¼), depending on the state of nature represented by´× µ ¾ Ä Ê ¢ . The state of nature is two-dimensional, where × indicates the relative productivity of each task while the aggregate productivity. When , the (aggregate) state is "good" and the output is always high regardless of the task choice. When , the state is "bad" and the output is high if and only if the right task,
i.e., Ü ×, is implemented. Letting Ô´Ü × µ ÔÖÓ Ý ½ Ü × , we thus have 
Information Acquisition
The cost of effort is given by ¼.
Contracts
The principal designs and offers a contract to each agent to maximize her expected profit. The output Ý is the only contractible variable in this environment. A feasible contract can thus be written as Ï ´Û ½½ Û ½¼ Û ¼½ Û ¼¼ µ where Û Ý Ý , , denotes the wage to be received by agent contingent on the outputs Ý and Ý . We impose a limited liability condition Û Ý Ý ¼, so that any wage payment must be nonnegative. The contracts offered are publicly observable, so that each can observe the other agent's contract.
The nature of a contract is determined largely by how each agent's compensation depends on the other agent's output. For expositional purposes, we use the following terminologies:
• Independent performance evaluation (IPE):´Û ½½ Û ¼½ µ ´Û ½¼ Û ¼¼ µ;
• Relative performance evaluation (RPE):´Û ½½ Û ¼½ µ ´Û ½¼ Û ¼¼ µ;
• Joint performance evaluation (JPE):´Û ½½ Û ¼½ µ ´Û ½¼ Û ¼¼ µ.
Communication and the Task Choice
Upon observing a signal, each agent communicates with each other to share the acquired information and chooses the task. More precisely, each agent simultaneously sends a message Ñ ¾ Ä Ê to the other: for clarity, we consider the message space which coincides with the signal space. The message is costless and unverifiable, so this message game belongs to the class of cheap talk. Given the message and his own observed signal, each agent then chooses his task Ü ¾ Ä Ê .
Preferences and the Timing
Both the principal and the agents are risk-neutral, where the principal maximizes the expected profit (the expected output minus the expected wage costs) while each agent maximizes the expected wage minus the effort cost. The timing of the model is summarized as follows:
1. The state of nature´ ×µ ¾ ¢ Ä Ê is randomly drawn.
2. The principal offers a contract Ï to each agent. 
whereas an agent has the incentive to differentiate if this is not satisfied. If (1) is satisfied for both of the agents, it is Pareto-efficient for them to coordinate their task choices (Ü ½ Ü ¾ ).
If it is satisfied for neither, it is then Pareto-efficient to differentiate (Ü ½ Ü ¾ ). Finally, if it is satisfied only for one of the agents, there is no Pareto-efficient outcome, and the agents must randomize and choose each task with equal probability. 8
Strategic Information Disclosure
We now explore conditions under which an agent has an incentive to reveal truthfully. Since an informed agent cannot be influenced by any message, we can focus on the case where the other agent is uninformed. Given that × Ñ
, there are two cases we need to consider.
The agent has no information and hence has no preference over the task choice. If there exists a Pareto-efficient outcome (both agents have the incentive to coordinate or differentiate), it is weakly optimal to report truthfully since the agent is totally indifferent between any messages. This means that under any symmetric contract, an uninformed agent has no incentive to lie.
If one agent has the incentive to coordinate while the other has the incentive to differentiate, on the other hand, truth telling cannot be induced on the equilibrium path. To see this,
if an agent reports truthfully, the agents end up with no information. In this case, they can never agree on who chooses which task and are hence forced to randomize over the tasks. This may or may not be in his best interest, depending on the type of contract he faces. To see this, suppose that × Ä without loss of generality. The agent has an incentive to lie only when he would like the other agent to choose Ü Ê; the best way to achieve this is to claim Ñ Ê. Given this, the agent truthfully discloses his observation iff
which we refer to as the condition for truth telling. If (2) does not hold, no message can be taken seriously by the other agent, and no information can hence be conveyed (a babbling equilibrium).
Optimal Organizations
Equilibrium with No Communication: a Benchmark
We start the analysis with a benchmark case where any form of communication is not feasible between the agents, possibly for some technological reasons. Each agent thus chooses the task independently without ever communicating with the other, as if there exists only one agent. This also precludes the possibility of task coordination when both of the agents are uninformed. For expositional purposes, we refer to this scheme as Independent Production.
This benchmark case is instrumental in illuminating the role of communication in the current setup.
Under this scheme, an agent has no choice but to choose the task randomly when he As is well known, in the presence of common stochastic shocks, the optimal contract in this case takes the form of RPE where an agent is compensated based on the difference in the outputs. RPE is generically superior in inducing costly effort as it filters out common stochastic shocks. 9 The expected profit under this optimal contract is given by In what follows, we assume that is sufficiently small, so that this condition holds.
Decision Making by Committee: Bilateral Communication
In the presence of common stochastic shocks, the optimal contract typically takes the form of RPE where the agents are compensated based on the difference in the outputs. One drawback of this type of contract is that by having the agents compete with each other, it necessarily impedes cooperation between them. In this particular context, even when one agent is informed, there is no incentive to reveal truthfully his own observation under this type of contract: the optimal contract in the absence of communication cannot satisfy the condition for truth telling (2). The lack of truthful communication entails an efficiency loss since information is typically a public good whose value does not depend on the number of people who use it. When the cost of communication is negligibly small, it is clearly ex post efficient to share all the relevant information within the organization.
Here, we seek for an equilibrium where both of the agents exert effort to acquire the information and then truthfully report what is observed. We refer to this situation as decision making by Committee, where both agents carry the same weight in the decision-making process ex ante with no restriction on the flow of information (bilateral communication).
An apparent virtue of Committee is that it allows the information to flow from an informed party to an uninformed party, making the best use of the existing knowledge within the organization.
In order to facilitate communication between the agents, the condition for truth telling becomes an additional constraint to be satisfied. Once (2) 
while the condition for truth telling is given by (2). The optimal contract must also satisfy
(1) so that the agents indeed have the incentive to coordinate. 
Lemma 2 The optimal contract under Committee is given by
Decision Making by Hierarchy: Unilateral Communication
As we have seen, it is apparently ex post efficient to facilitate communication between the agents because communication is free in the current setup. The problem is that it is not ex ante efficient because communication raises the agency cost of inducing costly effort. There may be a better way to exploit the benefit of communication than the symmetric contract obtained under Committee. The key is the nature of information: when communication is informative, only one agent needs to be informed. To minimize the cost arising from communication, we now let the conditions for information acquisition and truth telling hold for only one agent, say agent 1, so that information only flows from agent 1 to 2 but not the other way around. The chain of command is now hierarchical in that one orders the other what to do (note that the task choice is his private information).
Since agent 2 exerts no effort, we only need to look at agent 1's incentives. Suppose for now that both of the agents have the incentive to coordinate when uninformed. The expected payoff, denoted by À , is then given by
The agent exerts effort iff
We can then show the following. Note that under Hierarchy, the allocation of responsibility is asymmetric in that agent 1 is given high-powered incentives and also held accountable for agent 2's output (team incentives) while agent 2 is given low-powered incentives and in principle held accountable only for his own output (individual incentives). 10 There are two virtues of Hierarchy in this setup.
Lemma 3 The optimal contract under Hierarchy is
First, under Hierarchy, only one agent needs to be motivated to exert effort. Although this raises the probability that neither agent is informed compared to Committee, 11 this is an efficient way to exploit the fact that information transmission via communication is free.
Second, it also eliminates the freeriding incentive, which occupies a substantial part of the cost of communication under Committee. By allocating responsibility asymmetrically, agent 1 cannot rely on agent 2, which in turn raises agent 1's motivation to exert effort.
Comparison
We have thus far examined three distinct schemes: (i) Independent Production with no communication, (ii) Committee and (iii) Hierarchy. 12 We now compare each of these schemes and see which one yields the highest expected profit, especially when Hierarchy outperforms the other organizational forms.
When the outputs are positively correlated, RPE functions well by filtering out common stochastic shocks. It is thus clear that Independent Production, which employs RPE, emerges as the only profitable organizational form when is arbitrarily close to one. As decreases toward zero, on the other hand, the benefit of communication outweighs the cost, and Hierarchy outperforms Independent Production. 
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold
From propositions 2 and 3, we can now obtain a sufficient condition for Committee to be optimal. First, from proposition 2, Ð Ñ ¼ À ½, so that Committee outperforms Hierarchy for any . Second, from proposition 3,
The result implies that for any positive , Committee cannot be optimal if Ö is close to one.
Corollary 2 Committee is optimal if Á ¼
and is sufficiently close to zero or one.
In general, Committee works better when the cost of information acquisition is relatively small: this is intuitive because the cost of bilateral communication comes from the increase in the agency cost. This means that if an organization does not need to motivate its members to acquire information, Committee is often an efficient way to make decisions. After all, this is what we expect of a typical committee: in many cases, a committee consists of well informed experts to begin with, and information acquisition is rarely an issue. In such a situation, it is often less optimal to assign more weight on anyone's opinion by restricting the information flow; it thus makes more sense to treat its members more evenly.
Conclusion
This paper asks why hierarchies prevail in organizations in an environment where the principal can only allocate responsibility via incentive contracts but not authority. The focus of attention is placed on costly information acquisition and costless communication. In this setting, we show that the optimal incentive scheme is often asymmetric, where one agent is given high-powered team incentives while the other is given low-powered individual incentives. Under Hierarchy, the flow of information is restricted to be unilateral and this gives rise to the chain of command pertaining to hierarchial organizations. This asymmetric allocation of responsibility is the optimal way to acquire information and knowledge as a group when the agency cost is sufficiently severe. Given that these conditions are satisfied, the expected payoff for agent 1 is obtained as 
We have also assume that the agent has an incentive to differentiate, which means that which is further simplified to Given that these conditions are satisfied, the expected payoff for agent 1 is obtained as 
